[We examine over 7400 analyst recommendations made in the year after going public for IPOs from 1999 to 2000. Initiations of coverage at the end of the quiet period come almost exclusively from affiliated analysts, whereas initiations afterward are predominantly from unaffiliated analysts. Contrary to previous findings, we find no evidence that the market discounts recommendations from affiliated analysts once we control for recommendation characteristics and timing. Moreover, analyst coverage in the first year is not affected by underpricing, and after the flurry of initiations at the end of the quiet period, the number of analysts covering a firm during the following 11 months is unrelated to the number of managing underwriters.]

We examine the extent to which offer prices reflect public information for 3, 325 IPOs over the period 1990–1999. We focus primarily on four variables: share overhang, file range amendments, venture capital backing, and previous issue underpricing. We show that 35%–50% of the variation in IPO underpricing can be predicted using public information known before the offer date and therefore conclude that IPO offer prices underadjust to widely available public information to a much greater extent than previously documented.

We examine information spillovers in the context of seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). Rival firms react significantly positively (0.26%) to primary SEO announcements, indicative of a competitive effect, but negatively (−0.35%) to secondary share announcements, which is evidence of a contagion effect. Consistent with the view that primary equity offerings signal favorable industry prospects because firms presumably issue new shares to invest in profitable projects, we find that the rival response is positively related to analysts' EPS growth forecasts. However, when insiders are selling their shares through a secondary offer, this may suggest overvaluation and thus negatively impacts rival firms. Consistent with this view, we find when VCs sell through a secondary offerings, rivals experience a more significant negative reaction. We find rival firms are more likely to follow their peers and conduct a primary SEO if the market reacts favorably to their peer's SEO announcement. Finally, rival firms outperform secondary share issuers of equity, but not primary share issuers. Collectively, the findings support the view that insiders take advantage of windows of opportunity when they sell their own shares, but not when they raise capital for investing purposes.

During periods of high IPO underpricing, unaffiliated all-star analysts from high reputation banks issue fewer strong-buy recommendations while unaffiliated all-star analysts from low reputation banks do not change their level of optimism. In contrast, unaffiliated non-star analysts from both high and low reputation banks issue more strong-buy recommendations. Consistent with the results on analyst optimism, the market reacts more favorably to strong-buy recommendations by unaffiliated all-star analysts from high reputation banks than other unaffiliated analysts during high IPO underpricing periods. Finally, we find that unaffiliated non-star analysts from low reputation banks reduce their coverage following an SEO if they are not selected as a part of the managing syndicate. Collectively, our results indicate that during periods of high IPO underpricing unaffiliated analysts face conflicts of interest, but personal-level reputation, and to a lesser extent bank-level reputation, plays a role in reducing this bias.

Before the IPO bubble burst, the first day return for IPOs backed by top VC firms was double that of non-top VC IPOs. Top VC IPOs were also twice as likely to receive all-star analyst coverage and suffered twice as large negative returns upon lockup expiration. We argue that this was not a coincidence. Underwriters benefited from underpricing vis-à-vis allocation strategies whereas VCs gain from information momentum which allows them to cash-out at higher prices at lockup expiration. All-stars are a scarce resource underwriters allocate to their best clients (top VCs) who bring them repeat business. Post-bubble, regulatory shocks restricted preferential IPO allocations and reduced the value of all-star coverage. Consequently, these relations disappeared indicating that regulatory changes likely had the desired effect.

Between 2009 and 2013, the Fly on the Wall (FLY) leaked 58% of recommendation revisions with a median delay of 27 minutes relative to the IBES announcement time. We show that FLY improves price discovery, but leaked recommendations hamper brokers’ ability to offer price improvement on trades routed through them. Three major brokers sued FLY; using key court dates, we show significant wealth and real effects to the brokerage industry. Overall, the speed with which analyst recommendations are disseminated has led to more rapid price discovery at the expense of a decline in the scope of the sell-side research industry.

We examine the hypothesis that fluctuations in the aggregate supply of bank loans influence the supply of new equity capital. Using residual lending standards as a clean measure of aggregate loan supply and a VAR framework to aid identification, we find that a one-standard-deviation shock to lending standards results in 15% fewer IPOs. Shocks elicit strong responses from IPO-firms that are highly dependent on external capital and increase the number of withdrawals, strengthening the interpretation that the above is driven by changes in the supply of equity. Our results suggest that credit conditions are important to a well-functioning IPO market.

We examine how political geography affects firms' cost of debt. Local policy risk, measured by proximity to political power reflected in firms' position in the country's political map, is positively related to firms' cost of debt. Employing a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) estimation around presidential elections, we find that firms headquartered in states that become more aligned with the president after elections are exposed to more policy risk and thus incur higher yield spreads. Firms can manage policy risk by engaging in corporate political strategies. Consistent with the view that such political strategies protect firms against uncertainty about future policies, we find policy risk has less of an impact on a firm's cost of debt when the firm makes more PAC contributions or spends more money on lobbying.

In a large sample of shareholder initiated class action lawsuits from 1996 to 2011, we find a significant increase in informed insider option exercises during the class action period compared to the preceding quarter, and we find that this change is positively related to the probability of litigation. The market reaction to the announcement of lawsuits is negatively related to abnormal informed option exercises, but positively related to suits that ultimately get dismissed. These results suggest that the market can at least partially anticipate the merits and severity of the class action suit. In subsequent analyses, we find that CEO turnover is positively related to litigation, but not option exercises. Collectively, our results indicate that insiders knowingly trade on their private information.