[We employ a novel data set on almost 30,000 trade credit contracts to describe the broad characteristics of the parties that contract together and the key terms of these contracts. Whereas prior work has typically used information on only one side of the buyer-seller transaction, we utilize information on both, allowing for the first analysis of buyer-seller pairs. An equally important distinction is that we have multiple contracts for the same buyer or supplier firms, rather than a firm-average response, allowing for the correction of time-invariant firm characteristics that might determine the choice of credit terms. We find that the largest and most creditworthy buyers receive contracts with the longest maturities from smaller suppliers, and that discounts for early payment tend to be offered to riskier buyers.]

Factoring is explicitly linked to the value of a supplier’s accounts receivable and receivables are sold, rather than collateralized, and factored receivables are not part of the estate of a bankrupt firm. Therefore, factoring may allow a high-risk supplier to transfer its credit risk to higher quality buyers. Empirical tests find that factoring is larger in countries with greater economic development and growth and developed credit information bureaus. “Reverse factoring” may mitigate the problem of borrowers’ informational opacity if only receivables from high-quality buyers are factored. We illustrate the case of the Nafin reverse factoring program in Mexico.

This paper presents data on 76 partial credit guarantee schemes across 46 developed and developing countries. Based on theory, we discuss different organizational features of credit guarantee schemes and their variation across countries. We focus on the respective role of government and private sector and different pricing and risk reduction tools and how they are correlated across countries. We find that government has an important role to play in funding and management, but less so in risk assessment and recovery. There is a surprisingly low use of risk-based pricing and limited use of risk management mechanisms.

How capital structure, dividend policy, and corporate governance vary across countries has been the focus of recent studies, but how resources are reallocated in response to poor performance has not received as much attention. This paper argues that the market for corporate control and the formal bankruptcy/liquidation processes of a country are two key mechanisms through which corporate assets are reallocated. Ideally, an economy would only allow the best users of economic resources to retain the right to use those assets and any sub-optimal use would result in either a take-over by a more proficient owner or an asset sale. We present evidence that equity market delistings occur more frequently in countries with strong shareholder rights. Furthermore, both strong creditor and shareholder rights increase the use of bankruptcy, relative to acquisitions, as a mechanism to resolve financial distress. We also present some evidence that these mechanisms are not as effective in Japan.

This paper investigates how the supplier's bargaining power affects trade credit supply. We use a novel firm-level database of Chinese firms with unique information on the amount, terms, and payment history of trade credit extended to customers and detailed information on product market structure and clients-supplier relationships. We document that suppliers with weak bargaining power towards their customers are more likely to extend trade credit, have a larger share of goods sold on credit, and offer a longer payment period before imposing penalties. Important customers extend the payment period beyond what has been offered by their supplier and generate overdue payments. Furthermore, weak bargaining power suppliers are less likely to offer trade credit when credit-constrained by banks. Our findings suggest that suppliers use trade credit as a competitive device in the product market.

We use recent data on firm-level corporate governance (CG) rankings across 14 emerging markets and find that there is wide variation in firm-level governance in our sample and that the average firm-level governance is lower in countries with weaker legal systems. We explore the determinants of firm-level governance and find that governance is correlated with the extent of the asymmetric information and contracting imperfections that firms face. We also find that better corporate governance is highly correlated with better operating performance and market valuation. Finally, we provide evidence that firm-level corporate governance provisions matter more in countries with weak legal environments.

We formulate and test hypotheses about the role of bank ownership type—foreign, state-owned, and private domestic banks—in banking relationships. Our application uses data from India, an important developing nation. The empirical results are consistent with all of our hypotheses with regard to foreign banks. First, these banks tend to establish relationships with relatively transparent firms. Second, firms that have relationships with foreign banks are more likely to enter into multiple banking relationships and to maintain a larger number of such relationships. Finally, firms banking with foreign banks are more likely than others to diversify relationships across bank ownership types. The data are also consistent with the hypotheses that firms with relationships with state-owned banks are relatively unlikely to maintain multiple banking relationships, tend to interact with a smaller number of banks, and less often diversify across ownership types.

We test hypotheses about the effects of bank size, foreign ownership, and distress on lending to informationally opaque small firms using a rich new data set on Argentinean banks, firms, and loans. We also test hypotheses about borrowing from a single bank versus multiple banks. Our results suggest that large and foreign-owned institutions may have difficulty extending relationship loans to opaque small firms. Bank distress appears to have no greater effect on small borrowers than on large borrowers, although even small firms may react to bank distress by borrowing from multiple banks, raising borrowing costs and destroying some relationship benefits.

Why do some firms raise equity capital from a small number of “private” investors (e.g. Private Investment in Public Equities–PIPE), while other firms do so from a large number of small investors (e.g. Seasoned Equity Offering–SEO)? Recent studies list market timing, asymmetric information, and financial distress as the primary motives that drive the choice of equity raising mechanism. However, these results are based exclusively on the experience of US-based firms. This study examines 456 PIPE and 1910 SEO transactions of firms based in nine Asian countries to assess if the results reported for the US-based issuers are applicable to a wider set of firms. While market timing continues to be a significant driver of how firms choose between PIPE and SEO, unlike the US issuers, there is little evidence that Asian firms in our sample make this choice based on either asymmetric information or financial distress. As with the US firms, private investment provides significant certification for PIPE issuers. Finally, we find that both the operating performance as well as the stock price returns show little improvement for both PIPE as well as SEO issuers. Moreover, the difference between performance change of PIPE issuers is statistically indistinguishable from that of SEO issuers. This implies that PIPE investors do not provide meaningful benefits to the firms they invest in. Overall, our findings suggest that determinants for choosing specific equity issuance mechanism for international firms do not overlap completely with those for US-based firms.

Financial inclusion—defined as the use of formal accounts—can bring many benefits to individuals. Yet, we know very little about the factors underpinning it. This paper explores the individual and country characteristics associated with financial inclusion and the policies that are effective among those most likely to be excluded: poor, rural, female or young individuals. Overall, we find that greater financial inclusion is associated with lower account costs, greater proximity to financial intermediaries, stronger legal rights, and more politically stable environments. However, the effectiveness of policies to promote inclusion varies depending on the characteristics of the individuals considered.