A MONG THE BIG unsettled questions of modrem history and economic history, four loom large-the industrial revolution, the French revolution, the German inflation of the 1920s, and the world depression of the 1930s. All are still studied, debated giving rise to many theories, mostly mono-causal and conflicting. More unsettled questions may be on the way, for example the inflation of the 1980s and the stagnation of the early 1990s. But Gerald Feldman has written a big book that must be taken into account in any discussion of the German inflation, big in many senses, 1000 pages of double-column print (triple columns in the index), 4.48 pounds in weight at my local supermarket, and covering in the order of the subtitle the politics, economics, and sociology of this pathological episode. Specialists in any one discipline may find their own discipline relatively neglected, especially economists who tend to want more theory, as D. C. Coleman indicates, who asserts that theories are what economists make, while historians need evidence (1969, p. 8). The evidence here is prodigious: 49 tables, two-thirds that number of photographs and illustrations, 85 pages of endnotes, 24 pages of bibliography, and a 42-page index, the work of 15 years of study of the subject and 43 earlier publications of Feldman-books, articles, and edited work, some with colleagues, mostly his own. The feast is rich; some economists and economic historians may find it too rich for ready digestion. Feldman is aware of his problem in combining contradictory modes of analysis, but believes it necessary. Partly in a reaction to the work of Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich whose The German Inflation, 1914-1923 (1986) concludes that the results of the inflation on balance were favorable in giving Germany years of investment and full employment in a largely depressed world and ridding it of private foreign and all internal debt, he asserts:

This paper analyzes the repricing of employee stock options after market-wide crash. The model identifies sufficient conditions for renegotiation to be optimal and for optimal compensation to be a fixed salary plus stock options. Empirical results support the renegotiation prediction. Stock opition grants increase in both number and value after the 1987 crash. Firms with underwater options grant significantly more options post-crash than pre-crash, whereas firm with in-the-money options don't. Furthermore, firms suffering the largest impact from the crash are the most likely to increase grants after the crash.

This paper analyses the effects of growth on long-run unemployment using a search model of equilibrium unemployment where growth arises explicitly from the introduction of new technologies that require labour reallocation for their implementation. The analysis uncovers and compares between two competing effects of growth on unemployment. The first is a capitalisation effect, whereby an increase in growth raises the capitalised returns from creating jobs and consequently reduces the equilibrium rate of unemployment. The second is a creative destruction effect whereby an increase in growth reduces the duration of a job match, thereby raising the equilibrium level of unemployment both directly, by raising the job separation rate, and indirectly, by discouraging the creation of job vacancies.

This study uses intraday when-issued rate quotes to examine the rewards and risks of the Treasury coupon auctions for bidders who face different tradeoffs between the winner's curse and quantity risk. The data indicate that markups of auction average rates over bid when-issued rates at auction times average 3/8 basis point. I also find that when-issued rates react as strongly to bidding aggressiveness at auctions before the auction results are announced as theydo afterward, and that quantity risk is as important as the winner's curse.

This study examines the Treasury's experiment with single-price bond auctions in the mid-1970s and finds that, controlling for factors unrelated to auction technique, markups of auction average rates over when-issued rates shortly after auctions were a statistically significant seven to eight basis points higher at single-price auctions than at discriminating-price auctions. These results suggest that single-price auctions raised Treasury borrowing costs by roughly 3/4 percent of the issuing price of auctioned securities. Copyright 1994 by MIT Press.

Canadian firms that list securities on U.S. stock exchanges are generally required to provide a reconciliation of reported income measured using Canadian generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) to reported earnings measured using U.S. GAAP. This paper examines both the magnitudes and the information content of the reported reconciliations between CanadianGAAP income and U.S.GAAP income. Two recent studies of cross-country GAAP differences do not address U.S.-Canada differences because of perceived similarities between GAAP in the two countries (Amir, Harris, and Venuti [1993] and McQueen [1993]). If U.S.-Canada GAAP differences are in fact unimportant, then no further examination is warranted. Professional bodies, however, are

Abstract. This study provides further evidence about whether accounting choice decisions reflect a consistent strategy to manage income by investigating the relation between methods used in financial reports and lobbying positions on accounting for income taxes. A numerical income‐strategy score is calculated for each lobbyist based on whether the firm chose an income‐increasing or income‐decreasing alternative for the following: depreciation, inventory, investment tax credit, and pension amortization. We find that firms lobbying for no tax allocation, the most income‐increasing alternative, have higher average income strategies (more income increasing) than firms lobbying for comprehensive allocation, the most income‐decreasing alternative. Combining the firms favoring either no allocation or partial allocation (due to the conceptual similarity of these alternatives), we find that their average income strategy score is also higher than firms favoring comprehensive allocation. Further, firms favoring discounting deferred taxes, which would ordinarily increase net income by reducing the deferred portion of income tax expense, employ more income‐increasing strategies than firms opposed to discounting. In contrast, the hypothesized relationship was not found between income strategy and when the benefits anticipated from the use of a net operating loss carryforward should be recognized. Nevertheless, the combined lobbying positions differ significantly between both the upper and lower third and upper and middle third of the firms classified by their income strategy scores. We also provide analyses to examine whether income strategies can be used to predict lobbying positions. We find that the associations are not sufficiently strong to do so. Résumé. Les décisions relatives aux choix comptables sont‐elles le reflet d'une stratégie uniforme visant la gestion des bénéfices? Les auteurs jettent un éclairage nouveau sur cette question, en analysant la relation entre les méthodes utilisées dans les rapports financiers, et ils approfondissent également celle des positions de lobbying relatives à la comptabilisation des impôts sur le bénéfice. Les auteurs attribuent une note numérique à la stratégie de bénéfice de chaque lobbyiste, selon que l'entreprise a opté pour une méthode qui accroît ou décroît le bénéfice, à l'égard des éléments suivants: l'amortissement, les stocks, le crédit d'impôt à l'investissement et la ventilation des coûts découlant des régimes de retraite. Selon les auteurs, les entreprises qui militent en faveur du non‐report des impôts, l'option qui contribue le plus à accroître le bénéfice, poursuivent des stratégies de bénéfice moyen supérieur (contribuant davantage à hausser le bénéfice) que les entreprises qui militent en faveur du report intégral, l'option qui contribue le plus à décroître le bénéfice. Si l'on combine les entreprises qui favorisent le non‐report et celles qui favorisent un report partiel (compte tenu de la parenté conceptuelle de ces options), il appert que la note correspondant à leur stratégie de bénéfice moyen est, encore une fois, supérieure à celle des entreprises qui favorisent un report intégral. Plus encore, les entreprises qui favorisent l'actualisation des impôts reportés, ce qui devrait ordinairement accroître le bénéfice net en réduisant la portion différée de la charge fiscale, emploient des stratégies qui accroissent davantage le bénéfice que les entreprises qui s'opposent à l'actualisation. En revanche, la relation dont les auteurs posent l'hypothèse entre la stratégie de bénéfice et le moment de la constatation des avantages que l'on prévoit tirer d'un report prospectif de perte d'exploitation n'a pas été confirmée. Les positions de lobbying combinées s'écartent néanmoins sensiblement si l'on compare le tiers supérieur et le tiers inférieur de même que le tiers supérieur et le tiers médian des entreprises classées en fonction des notes attribuées à leur stratégie de bénéfice. Les auteurs procèdent également à des analyses visant à déterminer si les stratégies de bénéfice peuvent être utilisées pour prévoir les positions de lobbying. Ils en concluent que les associations ne sont pas suffisamment probantes pour permettre ces prévisions.

Standard models of policy credibility, defined as the expectation that an announced policy will be carried out, emphasize the preferences of the policymaker and the role of tough policies in signaling toughness and raising credibility. Whether a policy is carried out, however, will also reflect the state of the economy. We present a model in which a policymaker maintains a fixed parity in good times, but devalues if the unemplo3nnent rate gets too high. Our main conclusion is that if there is persistence in unemplo3n3ient, observing a tough policy in a given period may lower rather than raise the credibility of a no-devaluation pledge in subsequent periods. We test this implication on EMS interest rates and find support for our hypothesis.