Knowledge that Transforms

We find that division managers who are connected to the CEO are substantially less likely than others to depart from the firm and are more likely to be promoted. Connected managers are protected when performance is poor, and they display no special ability to improve performance given this protection. Connections matter more in weak governance/incentive environments, and the external labor market and stock market appear skeptical of connected managers’ talents. While much of the evidence suggests inefficient favoritism, connected managers are protected more in peripheral segments, suggesting a possible efficiency benefit in helping to resolve intrafirm information problems.

We examine compensation for endowment Chief Investment Officers (CIOs) overseeing portfolios with significant allocations to alternatives. We find widespread use of bonuses and that large endowments with high alternative allocations hire CIOs with stronger backgrounds, pay them more, and have higher pay-for-performance sensitivity. We find weak evidence of a relationship between compensation and future performance. Our results align with contract theory predictions but differ from empirical findings on pension funds. Endowments pay CIOs more, rely more on bonuses, attract more experienced professionals, and have lower turnover than pensions. This suggests more effective talent management compared to politically influenced public pensions.

Antitakeover measures are controversial because the evidence of their net effect on shareholders is mixed. We propose that, for many firms, the potential bonding benefits outweigh the agency costs of the quiet life, explaining the mixed results. We study business combination and poison pill laws as exogenous shocks to takeover vulnerability and use shareholder valuation of internal slack as an indicator of the net effect of takeover protection. Firms susceptible to quiet life agency problems exhibit a decrease in the market-assessed value of internal slack. Conversely, cash appreciates at companies where takeover protection bonds commitments with major counterparties.

This paper studies how investor heterogeneity impacts equilibrium debt maturity. The optimal issuance strategy combines long- and short-term debts. A long-term debt contains default risk but hedges against intermediate downturns. A short-term debt provides repayment commitment but requires being rolled over and becomes risky during downturns. Issuing multiple debt maturities spreads the cost of these risky claims to investors most willing to hold risk at different points in time. The model predicts that debt maturity is more dispersed with lower financing costs and more investment opportunities when debt ownership is spread among many different types of investors.

We find that 43% of firms that make payouts also raise capital during the same year, resulting in 31% of aggregate payouts being externally financed, primarily with debt. Most financed payouts cannot be explained by payout smoothing in response to volatile earnings or investment (rather, they are the result of firms persistently setting payouts above free cash flow). In fact, 25% of aggregate payouts could not have been paid without the firms simultaneously raising capital. Profitable firms with moderate growth use debt-financed payouts to jointly manage their leverage and cash, thus highlighting the close relationship between payout and capital structure decisions.

This study employs variance ratios (VRs) to assess the roles of regulation and liquidity on cryptocurrency market efficiency, focusing on crypto-assets subject to varying degrees of regulation. Our findings reveal that cryptocurrencies supervised by FinCEN-licensed exchanges (IEO-L) exhibit market efficiency similar to SEC-regulated traditional stock offerings (IPOs). Conversely, noncompliant crypto-assets display higher market inefficiency. We also establish a connection between regulatory compliance and issuing entity reputation mechanisms. Our results indicate that compliance with existing regulatory norms enhances efficiency and reduces investor risks in crypto-assets. Furthermore, assets voluntarily adhering to regulatory norms can attain efficiency akin to government-regulated assets.

Dynamic equilibrium models based on present value computation not only imply that returns are predictable but also generate particular short-term patterns of predictability in asset returns. I take advantage of this to construct a set of tests of equilibrium generated predictability (EGP). I apply the tests to document two puzzles: First, option-implied or realized measures of volatility ought to predict returns but do not; and second, the variance risk premium (VRP) predicts returns but only at long horizons. VRP fails the tests of EGP as the term structure of predictable variation is inconsistent with an equilibrium interpretation.

We develop methods for testing factor models when the weights in portfolios of factors and test assets can vary with lagged information. We derive and evaluate consistent standard errors and finite sample bias adjustments for unconditional maximum squared Sharpe ratios and their differences. Bias adjustment using a second-order approximation performs well. We derive optimal zero-beta rates for models with dynamically trading portfolios. Factor models’ Sharpe ratios are larger but standard test asset portfolios’ maximum Sharpe ratios are larger still when there is dynamic trading. As a result, most of the popular factor models are rejected.

Returns to currency carry and momentum compensate for the risk of global interest rate volatility (IRV), with risk exposures explaining 92% of the cross-sectional return variations. This unified explanation stems from its impact on foreign exchange intermediaries. An intermediary-based exchange rate model shows that a higher global IRV increases the uncertainty of future risk-taking and tightens current financial constraints. Position unwinding triggers loss of carry and momentum. Additional empirical results confirm this economic channel. Global IRV risk is also negatively priced in other currency strategies and momentum. The explanatory power is not driven by existing measures of uncertainty or intermediary constraints.

This article proposes and estimates a tractable, arbitrage-free valuation model for corporate coupon bonds that includes a more realistic recovery rate process. Most existing studies use a recovery rate process that is misspecified because it includes recovery for coupons due after default. Misspecification errors from assuming recovery on all coupons can be substantial; they increase with recovery rates, coupons, maturity, and default probabilities. For a large sample of market transactions, i) our model has lower pricing errors than one assuming recovery on all coupons and ii) the magnitude of our model’s outperformance is linked to misspecification errors from assuming recovery on coupons.