Knowledge that Transforms

The modern world is the product of two momen tous changes: the Industrial Revolution of 1800, which brought sustained efficiency advances in economies, and the Demographic Transition of 1900, which channeled those efficiency advances mainly into increased income per capita, instead of increases in population. How these revolutions were connected has been a persistent unsolved puzzle in the history of growth. The Demographic Transition was achieved without any improve ment in contraceptive technologies from those of 1800 and earlier. It was a possibility for all preindustrial societies. Why did it occur only after the Industrial Revolution? The key component of the Malthusian econ

Economists generally assume that the state has sufficient institutional capacity to support markets and levy taxes. This paper develops a framework where “policy choices” in market regulation and taxation are constrained by past investments in legal and fiscal capacity. It studies the economic and political determinants of such investments, demonstrating that legal and fiscal capacity are typically complements. The results show that, among other things, common interest public goods, such as fighting external wars, as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions, are conducive to building state capacity. Some correlations in cross-country data are consistent with the theory. (JEL D72, E62, H11, H20, P14)

Managers often face a choice between authority and persuasion. In particular, since a firm’s formal and relational contracts and its culture and norms are quite rigid in the short term, a manager who needs to prevent an employee from undertaking the wrong action has the choice between either trying to persuade this employee or relying on interpersonal authority. 1 Simon (1947) noted, for example, that ‘when... disagreement is not resolved by discussion, persuasion, or other means of conviction, then it must be decided by the authority of one or the other participant ’ and that ‘in actual practice [...] authority is liberally admixed with suggestion and persuasion. ’ Obviously, in choosing between persuasion and authority the manager makes a cost-benefit trade-off. This paper studies that trade-off, focusing in particular on agency conflicts that originate in open disagreement, in the sense of differing priors. To that purpose, I will study a setting in which a principal and an agent are involved in a project. The project’s outcome depends on decisions by both the principal and the agent and also depends on complementary private effort by the agent. A key issue is that the principal and agent may openly disagree on which decisions are most likely to lead to a success, even though no player has private information, i.e. the players have differing

Risk Preferences in the PSID: Individual Imputations and Family Covariation by Miles S. Kimball, Claudia R. Sahm and Matthew D. Shapiro. Published in volume 99, issue 2, pages 363-68 of American Economic Review, May 2009

The Impact of Unexpected Maternal Death on Education: First Evidence from Three National Administrative Data Links by Stacey H. Chen, Yen-Chien Chen and Jin-Tan Liu. Published in volume 99, issue 2, pages 149-53 of American Economic Review, May 2009

The twentieth century saw a dramatic increase in the number of women in the labor force, as well as a steady increase in the number of selfemployed women during the past three decades. This increase in labor force participation represents a striking change in the allocation of women’s time between work and home activities. Despite the growing literature examining self-employed women, little is known about how self-employed women divide their time between work and other life activities. The flexibility afforded by self-employment is often regarded as a way to better balance work and home activities. Indeed, the existing econometric studies indicate that women choose self-employment primarily because of family or lifestyle factors (Theresa Devine 1994; Richard K. Caputa and Arthur Dolinsky 1998; Richard J. Boden 1999; Greg Hundley 2000). Yet studies outside the economics literature seem to indicate that self-employed women do not necessarily experience more family satisfaction (Holly E. Buttner and Dorothy P. Moore 1997; Saroj Parasuraman and Claire A. Simmers 2001; Richard DeMartino, Robert Barbato, and Paul H. Jacques 2006). A source of the difference might be that the econometric studies use Human Capital aCquisition and EntrEprEnEursHip †

This paper explores how to optimally set taxes and transfers when taxation authorities are uninformed about individuals' value of time in both market and nonmarket activities; and can observe both market-income and time allocated to market employment. We show that optimal redistribution in this environment involves a cutoff wage whereby workers above the cutoff are taxed as they increase their income, while workers earning a wage below the cutoff receive an income supplement as they increase their income. Finally, we show that the optimal program transfers zero income to individuals who choose not to work. (JEL D31, H21, H23, H24)

International audience

In August 1982, after a year in a deep recession that had several months left to run, Congress passed the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA), scaling back the large Reagan tax cuts that had been enacted just over one year earlier as part of the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA). Legislation over the same period cut near-term federal spending, with reductions in nondefense spending swamping additions to defense spending (Congressional Budget Office 1983, Table 8). Together, the spending reductions and TEFRA were estimated to have increased the fiscal-year 1983 primary surplus by $50 billion, or about 1.5 percent of GDP. During the next U.S. recession, in October 1990, a budget summit meeting of President Bush and Congressional leaders produced legislation aimed at reducing the cumulative deficit by $500 billion over five fiscal years, including $33 billion in fiscal-year 1991. The summit also produced the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA), introducing new budget rules aimed at controlling budget deficits and discretionary spending. As in the previous recession, budget deficits captured the attention of policy makers and strongly influenced their fiscal policy actions. As 2008 drew to a close one year into the most serious U.S. recession at least since 1982, Congress and the incoming Obama administration were moving toward adopting legislation of a

We experimentally test an endogenous-timing investment model in which subjects privately observe their cost of investing and a signal correlated with the common investment return. Subjects overinvest, relative to Nash. We separately consider whether subjects draw inferences, in hindsight, and use foresight to delay profitable investment and learn from market activity. In contrast to Nash, cursed equilibrium, and level-k predictions, behavior hardly changes across our experimental treatments. Maximum likelihood estimates are inconsistent with belief-based theories. We offer an explanation in terms of boundedly rational rules of thumb, based on insights about the game, which provides a better fit than quantal response equilibrium. (JEL C72, D82, D83, G11)