Knowledge that Transforms

Human capital differences across countries can appear large or small depending on measurement methods. This Reply clarifies key assumptions and conceptual distinctions across accounting approaches. Accounting-based arguments for small human capital differences are difficult to sustain. By contrast, large human capital differences are theoretically and empirically coherent. Non-accounting arguments against large human capital variation are examined and their weaknesses pinpointed. This Reply also suggests a fruitful way forward for this literature, providing a natural conception of human capital that integrates literatures on ideas and institutions with the accounting of Jones (2014). (JEL E24, I26, J24, J31)

We revisit the revenue comparison of standard auction formats, including first-price, second-price, and English auctions. We rank auctions according to their revenue guarantees, i.e., the greatest lower bound of revenue across all informational environments, where we hold fixed the distribution of bidders’ values. We conclude that if we restrict attention to the symmetric affiliated models of Milgrom and Weber (1982) and monotonic pure-strategy equilibria, first-price, second-price, and English auctions are revenue guarantee equivalent: they have the same revenue guarantee, which is equal to that of the first-price auction as characterized by Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2017). If we consider all equilibria or if we allow more general models of information, then first-price auctions have a greater revenue guarantee than all other auctions considered. (JEL D44, D83)

We study the market for ratings agencies in the commercial mortgage backed securities sector leading up to and including the financial crisis of 2007–2008. Using a structural model adapted from the auctions literature, we characterize the incentives of ratings agencies to distort ratings in favor of issuers. We find an important equilibrium distortion, which decreased after the crisis. We study several counterfactual experiments motivated by recent policymaking in this industry. (JEL D44, G01, G24)

I study expertise acquisition in a model of trading under asymmetric information. I propose and implement a method to measure r, the ratio of the marginal social value to the marginal private value of expertise. This can be decomposed into three sufficient statistics: traders’ average profits, the fraction of bad assets among traded assets, and the elasticity of good assets traded with respect to capital inflows. I measure r = 0.16 for the junk bond underwriting market. Since this is less than 1, it implies that marginal investments in expertise destroy surplus. (JEL D82, G11, G14, G21, L84)

I characterize the optimal financial regulation policy in an economy where financial intermediaries trade capital assets on behalf of households, but must retain an equity stake to align incentives. Financial regulation is necessary because intermediaries cannot be excluded from privately trading in capital markets. They don’t internalize that high asset prices force everyone to bear more risk. The socially optimal allocation can be implemented with a tax on asset holdings. I derive a sufficient statistic for the externality and use market data on leverage and volatility of intermediaries’ equity to measure it. (JEL D82, G01, G12, G20, G31, H25)

We address how using different censoring thresholds and imputation procedures affects the baseline results of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Hong (2015). Higher censoring thresholds introduce measure ment error and outliers that generate wide variability in results across weighting schemes, but methods that explicitly control for outliers confirm the results of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Hong (2015) for all censoring thresholds. We also illustrate how the BLS’s approach to imputing missing prices can introduce a cyclical bias into measures of posted price inflation when store-switching is present in the data. (JEL D12, E31, E32, L25, L81)

International trade collapsed, and also became much less multilateral, during the 1930s. Previous studies, looking at aggregate trade flows, have argued that trade policies had relatively little to do with either phenomenon. Using a new dataset incorporating highly disaggregated information on the United Kingdom’s imports and trade policies, we find that while conventional wisdom is correct regarding the impact of trade policy on the total value of British imports, discriminatory trade policies can explain the majority of Britain’s shift toward Imperial imports in the 1930s. (JEL F13, F14, F54, N74)

We develop a rational theory of liquidity sentiments in which the market outcome in any given period depends on agents’ expectations about market conditions in future periods. Our theory is based on the interaction between adverse selection and resale considerations giving rise to an intertemporal coordination problem that yields multiple self-fulfilling equilibria. We construct “sentiment” equilibria in which sunspots generate fluctuations in prices, volume, and welfare, all of which are positively correlated. The intertemporal nature of the coordination problem disciplines the set of possible sentiment dynamics. In particular, sentiments must be sufficiently persistent and transitions must be stochastic. We consider an extension with production in which asset quality is endogenously determined and provide conditions under which sentiments are a necessary feature of any equilibrium. A testable implication is that assets produced in good times are of lower average quality than those produced in bad times. (JEL D84, D82, E32, E44, G12)

We model the dynamics of discrimination and show how its evolution can identify the underlying source. We test these theoretical predictions in a field experiment on a large online platform where users post content that is evaluated by other users on the platform. We assign posts to accounts that exogenously vary by gender and evaluation histories. With no prior evaluations, women face significant discrimination. However, following a sequence of positive evaluations, the direction of discrimination reverses: women’s posts are favored over men’s. Interpreting these results through the lens of our model, this dynamic reversal implies discrimination driven by biased beliefs. (JEL C93, D83, J16, J71)

We assume that domestic (foreign) agents, when investing abroad, can only trade in the foreign (domestic) risk-free rates. In a preference-free environment, we derive the exchange rate volatility and risk premia in any such incomplete spanning model, as well as a measure of exchange rate cyclicality. We find that incomplete spanning lowers the volatility of exchange rate, increases the risk premia but only by creating exchange rate predictability, and does not affect the exchange rate cyclicality. (JEL E32, F31, F44, G15)