ABTRACT This study investigates the way that experienced audit committee Chairs address barriers to effective performance. We conceptualize audit committees as groups of individuals gathering, elaborating, and sharing information, and identify key group barriers to effective audit committee oversight. Drawing on 24 interviews with audit committee Chairs from leading Australian-listed companies, we provide new evidence of the approaches used in practice to address information-processing barriers faced by audit committees. Specifically, we identify six key mechanisms: (1) audit committee composition; (2) pre-meetings; (3) handling of disagreements between management and auditors; (4) formal audit committee meeting facilitation; (5) promoting audit committee skepticism; and (6) external auditor selection. Our findings provide insights for audit committee members, audit partners, and policy-makers as they aim to improve financial reporting and audit quality. These findings also have important implications for research designs of future experimental research.

We examine how the ordering of information within quarterly earnings announcements influences investor response to those announcements. Specifically, we examine whether earlier discussion of earnings information, and earlier discussion of qualitatively positive or negative information, is associated with stronger responses to that information. Controlling for the linguistic content of the earnings announcement, we find a positive relation between investor response to information and the prioritization of that information in the earnings announcement. We find no evidence of investor over-reaction and, to the contrary, find some evidence that investors under-react to prioritized information. Our evidence, in conjunction with experimental evidence in Elliott (2006), suggests that information placement influences investors' responses. However, unlike the experimental evidence in Elliott (2006), our archival results suggest that investor response to information placement is warranted, rather than the result of an unintentional cognitive effect. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

The within-year walkdown of analysts' earnings forecasts has largely been attributed to analysts' incentives to curry favor with managers. We appeal to cognitive psychology literature on motivated reasoning and propose that forecasting difficulty interacts with such incentives to yield the observed walkdown. Higher forecasting difficulty generates a wider range of outcomes from which analysts can justify optimistically biased forecasts. In regression analyses, we find that the interaction between analysts' incentives for optimism and difficulty exhibits the strongest effect on earnings walkdowns. We also examine revenue forecasts as a benchmark of lower forecasting difficulty and find that revenue walkdowns are relatively diminutive. However, when analysts forecast losses, revenue forecasts are more critical and exhibit markedly steeper walkdowns. Our results suggest that analyst forecast walkdowns are better characterized by an interactive effect between analysts' strategic incentives for optimism and forecasting difficulty. JEL Classifications: G17; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text.

This study examines the informational effects of unit of account choices in the context of a proposed standard on lease accounting. Standard-setters have tentatively decided that leases in excess of one year should be recognized on a lessee's balance sheet, including optional lease periods, even though the lessee can choose not to renew the lease. We argue that this approach lacks representational faithfulness and creates an informational problem for users. Using an experiment, we show that the proposed treatment of renewal options has a negative effect on lenders' willingness to lend to a firm with renewal options. However, we also show that disaggregating the capitalized optional renewal periods from the fixed-term lease obligation mitigates some of the negative effects of the proposed approach, particularly when disaggregation occurs on the face of the financial statements. These results should be of interest to standard-setters as they deliberate changes to lease accounting and when considering the trade-offs that can arise with expansive unit of account choices. Data Availability: The experimental data are available for purposes of replication. Please contact the authors..

Agents in two-sided matching games vary in characteristics that are unobservable in typical data on matching markets. We investigate the identification of the distribution of unobserved characteristics using data on who matches with whom. In full generality, we consider many-to-many matching and matching with trades. The distribution of match-specific unobservables cannot be fully recovered without information on unmatched agents, but the distribution of a combination of unobservables, which we call unobserved complementarities, can be identified. Using data on unmatched agents restores identification.

This study examines the link between credit supply and hospital health outcomes. We use bank stress tests as exogenous shocks to credit access for hospitals that have lending relationships with tested banks. We find that affected hospitals shift their operations to increase resource utilization following a negative credit shock but reduce the quality of their care to patients across a variety of measures, including a significant increase in risk-adjusted readmission and mortality rates. The results indicate that access to credit can affect the quality of health care hospitals deliver, pointing to important spillover effects of credit market frictions on health outcomes.

Discrepancies in International Data: An Application to China-Hong Kong Entrepot Trade by Robert C. Feenstra, Wen Hai, Wing T. Woo and Shunli Yao. Published in volume 89, issue 2, pages 338-343 of American Economic Review, May 1999

When determining new equity grants, corporate boards face a tradeoff between the CEO’s incentives generated from the grant’s duration versus those arising from the convexity of the embedded equity risk. We hypothesize and find that boards lengthen the horizon of new compensation grants in the presence of greater pre-existing compensation sensitivity to stock return volatility (vega). In addition, consistent with our hypothesis, we find stronger results in the presence of greater left-tail risk. Further, employing two exogenous shocks to left-tail risk, we provide evidence consistent with our hypothesis that grant horizons are related to risk incentives. Our analysis of the interaction of these two incentive mechanisms provides new insights on compensation contracting.

In this study, we consider how the accumulating nature and income direction of audit differences influence negotiated audit adjustments. We test our expectations by constructing dyads consisting of experienced auditors and financial officers, allowing them to interact via a web-based instrument. As predicted, based on expectancy violation theory and consideration of negotiation leverage, these audit difference characteristics alter the behaviors and negotiated outcomes of our participants. Specifically, dyads determine smaller adjustments when audit differences accumulate over time. Analysis of auditor-client expectations and dialog suggests the leverage of the negotiators impacts the arguments used and the persuasiveness of those arguments. Dyads also produce smaller adjustments when an accumulating audit difference increases, rather than decreases, income, due in part to clients successfully using conservatism as a persuasive argument to convince auditors to concede. Our method provides insight into how these effects occur and how the social process can alter auditors' pre-negotiation expectations.

Social ties between mutual funds and the companies in which they invest (investees) can both facilitate information transfers and encourage favoritism. Using the investment choices of mutual funds in China, we compare investment performance of holdings in companies that are socially connected to mutual funds versus those that are not. We find that funds allocate more investment to connected investees' stocks, especially when a fund is weakly monitored. This overweighting is greater in times of poor investee performance, when the benefits of additional investment to the connected investees are high. Weakly monitored funds' preference for connected stocks hurts the returns of these funds, yielding a 6.6 percent lower annualized risk-adjusted return, relative to closely monitored funds. These results suggest that, absent sufficient monitoring, agency conflicts generated by social networks can dominate the information advantages of these networks.