Facing pressure to meet short-term earnings expectations, corporate managers often take actions that are perceived as value-destroying. Our study provides empirical evidence supporting an alternative view: earnings pressure can discipline managers to undertake value-enhancing actions by refocusing on the firm’s core products. Consistent with this product refocus hypothesis, we find that firms under earnings pressure reduce investment in non-core products, leading to the subsequent underperformance of these non-core products, whereas the performance of core products remains unaffected. As predicted, product refocus is stronger when managers exhibit ex ante high-level agency problems. To strengthen identification, we exploit shocks arising from analyst brokerage mergers and closures. Our study suggests a bright side of earnings pressure—it helps reduce agency-motivated product diversification.

Concerns that goodwill impairments unresponsiveness to declining performance produces inflated goodwill led standard-setters to reconsider post-acquisition impairment-only accounting. We use granular large-scale data to provide institutionally relevant novel descriptive evidence motivated by this hotly debated accounting standard. Comparing goodwill versus other acquired intangibles growth rates for firms reporting goodwill throughout the 2010–2020 post-FAS 141(R) period provides no evidence of runaway goodwill inflation concerns. For firms with goodwill anytime during 2010–2020 we use Shapley values to explore the explanatory power of performance factors affecting goodwill impairments. Consistent with standard-setters’ intent, single-segment market performance explains 81 percent of goodwill impairment incidence variation (controlling for Fama-French-38 industry and time fixed-effects). Limited evidence of reduced impairment incidence after incorporating FASB sanctioned control premia or alternative market values provides little support for discretionary impairment avoidance. Conversely, higher impairment incidence when book values incorporate IFRS (2020) proposed off-balance-sheet headroom or market-to-book decreases supports discretionary impairment recognition. Data Availability: The data used in this study are obtained from commercial sources, including Compustat, Calcbench, I/B/E/S, FactSet Mergerstat/BVR, and Peters and Taylor's intangible capital dataset.

We examine firms’ voluntary disclosures of innovation under technology coopetition, focusing on technology standard setting organizations (SSOs). Technology coopetition is characterized by (1) cooperation to determine technology standards, which requires information sharing to reach consensus, and (2) competition for standard implementation to obtain standard-essential patents, which create incentives for firms to deviate from the expected level of information sharing. We document a decrease in 10-K narrative R&D disclosures, more generic 10-K narrative R&D disclosures, and a longer delay of patent disclosures via the USPTO after a firm joins an SSO. Among alternative explanations, our evidence is most supportive of the hypothesis that firms strategically withhold innovation information.

We find that corporate credit rating changes have an effect on firms' voluntary disclosure behavior that is independent of the information they convey about firm fundamentals. Our analyses exploit two separate quasi-experimental settings that generate either exogenous credit rating downgrades or credit rating upgrades (i.e., credit rating label changes). We find evidence of a negative relation between the direction of the credit rating label change and the provision of voluntary disclosure in both settings—firms respond to exogenous downgrades by increasing voluntary disclosure and to exogenous upgrades by decreasing voluntary disclosure. The effects we document are attributable to the regulatory role rather than the information role of credit ratings. Overall, our analyses indicate that credit rating agencies as gatekeepers influence firms' provision of voluntary disclosure. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

We document time-varying investor sentiment for corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. We show that announcements of CSR activities generate positive abnormal returns during periods when investors place a valuation premium on CSR performance. In addition, we find that firms boost CSR performance in response to investor sentiment, and that this response is more pronounced for those firms that are more inclined to respond to investor sentiment due to valuation uncertainty and investor horizon. Our results suggest that investor sentiment plays a role in firms' commitment to CSR. JEL Classifications: M41; D82; G14; G30; G31; G32; G34. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.

Previous theoretical arguments suggest that industrial diversification provides a co-insurance effect that decreases the firm's default risk. In this paper, we endogenously estimate a firm's segment disclosure quality and investigate whether the quality of segment disclosures significantly affects bond investors' assessment of the co-insurance effect of diversification. We document that bonds issued by industrially diversified firms with high-quality segment disclosures have significantly lower yields than bonds issued by diversified firms with low-quality segment disclosures. We also find that the negative relation between industrial diversification and bond yields becomes stronger when firms improve segment disclosures as a result of FAS 131. Finally, we show that high-quality segment disclosures are associated with lower syndicated loan spreads for a subsample of loans issued by large bank syndicates, which are more likely to rely on publicly reported segment information.

Managers exercise considerable discretion over how they announce an accounting restatement in a press release. Some firms issue a press release that discloses the restatement in the headline (high prominence). Others provide a press release with a headline on a different subject (for example, earnings news) but describe the restatement in the body of the release (medium prominence). The remaining firms discuss the restatement at the end of the press release in a footnote to operating results (low prominence). Mean three-day returns differ considerably across these three categories of prominence (−8.3, −4.0, and −1.5 percent, respectively). We find that disclosure prominence is significantly negatively associated with returns in a model that controls for the seriousness of the GAAP violation, restatement magnitude, other restatement characteristics, and potential endogeneity. Similarly, we find the likelihood of class action lawsuits is significantly reduced with less prominent disclosure.

The efficiency of publicly-subsidized, privately-provisioned social insurance programs depends on the interaction between strategic insurers and the subsidy mechanism. We study this interaction in the context of Medicare's prescription drug coverage program. We find that the observed mechanism is successful in keeping "raise-the-subsidy" incentives relatively low, acts much like a flat voucher, and obtains a level of welfare close to the optimal voucher. Across a range of counterfactuals, we find that more efficient subsidy mechanisms share three features: they retain the marginal elasticity of demand, limit the exercise of market power, and preserve the link between prices and marginal costs.

We investigate the possibility that limited participation in asset markets, and the stock market in particular, might explain the lack of correspondence between the sample moments of the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution and asset returns in U.K. data. We estimate ownership probabilities to separate “likely” shareholders from nonshareholders, enabling us to control for changing composition effects as well as selection into the group. We then construct estimates of the IMRS for each of these different groups and consider their time‐series properties. We find that the consumption growth of shareholders is more volatile than that of nonshareholders and more highly correlated with excess returns to shares. In particular, one cannot reject the predictions of the consumption capital asset pricing model for the group of households predicted to own both assets. This is in contrast to the failure of the model when estimated on data for all households.

We use microeconomic data on households to estimate the parameters of the demand for currency derived from a generalized Baumol‐Tobin model. Our data set contains information on average currency, deposits, and other interest‐bearing assets; the number of trips to the bank; the size of withdrawals; and ownership and use of ATM cards. We model the demand for currency accounting for adoption of new transaction technologies and the decision to hold interest‐bearing assets. The interest rate and expenditure flow elasticities of the demand for currency are close to the theoretical values implied by standard inventory models. However, we find significant differences between individuals with an ATM card and those without. The estimates of the demand for currency allow us to calculate a measure of the welfare cost of inflation analogous to Bailey’s triangle, but based on a rigorous microeconometric framework. The welfare cost of inflation varies considerably within the population but never turns out to be very large (about 0.1 percent of consumption or less). Our results are robust to various changes in the econometric specification. In addition to the main results based on the average stock of currency, the model receives further support from the analysis of the number of trips to and average withdrawals from the bank and the ATM.