We employ a novel machine learning technique to classify analysts’ forecast revisions into five types based on how the revision weighs publicly available signals. We label these forecast types as quant, sundry, contrarian, herder, and independent forecasts. Our tests reveal that a greater diversity of forecast types within the consensus is associated with increased consensus dispersion and improved consensus accuracy. Additionally, consensus diversity is associated with an improved information environment for firms, as reflected in reduced earnings announcement information asymmetry and volatility, higher earnings response coefficients, and faster price formation. Our study sheds light on how analysts revise their forecasts and documents capital market benefits associated with different analyst forecasting approaches.

We provide evidence from the first short-window event study of consumers’ perceptual responses to earnings announcements using daily consumer perception data. We document a positive association between the change in consumers’ overall perceptions of a brand at the time of the earnings announcement and the earnings surprise—that is, a positive consumer earnings response coefficient (CERC). CERC is larger when there is greater traditional news or social media activity, indicating that news dissemination is an important channel for consumers to respond to earnings news. Moreover, CERC varies based on brand and consumer characteristics. Changes in consumer perceptions at the time of the earnings announcement are positively associated with changes in purchase consideration and intent and with changes in realized future sales growth. To maximize identification, we document a positive and statistically significant CERC in a controlled experiment. Our findings demonstrate the importance of earnings to an important stakeholder. Data Availability: Data are available from the sources cited in the text.

We examine the effect of performance-based pay on misreporting intended to benefit a social mission. We show that performance-based pay decreases people's propensity to misreport for a social mission in a not-for-profit setting (Experiment 1). We similarly show that in a for-profit setting, performance-based pay also decreases misreporting propensity for a social mission, although not for a non-social mission (Experiment 2). Finally, using a framed field experiment with participants attending a conference hosted by a real charity, we show that performance-based pay reduces actual misreporting when misreporting leads to more donations for the charity (Experiment 3). These results are consistent with our theory suggesting that, relative to fixed pay, performance-based pay imposes additional costs on misreporting employees' self-concepts of benevolence and honesty.

We examine how information dissemination via mobile device applications (apps) affects nonprofessional investors' judgments. In response to the prevalence of mobile device use, the media ungroups content into smaller pieces to accommodate users, and apps use push notifications to highlight this content. These changes increase users' ability to access investment information in real time, leaving some investors feeling as if they are missing out if they are not continuously connected. We validate a scale to capture investors' fear of missing out on investment information (I-FoMO) and document that I-FoMO is distinct from traditional FoMO that occurs in social settings. Then, using an experiment, we find that receiving ungrouped content via a mobile device has a greater effect on investment allocations in the presence, rather than absence, of push notifications. Further, we find that these results hold for higher, but not for lower, I-FoMO investors. JEL Classifications: G23; M41; M48; M49. Data Availability: Contact the authors.

In the presence of litigation-facing suppliers, the supply chain relationship is at risk. Suppliers with principal customers (dependent suppliers) have a higher concentration of sales to customers, and they are more at risk relative to suppliers without principal customers (non-dependent suppliers). As a result, we predict and find that litigation disclosure patterns differ for the two supplier types: dependent suppliers are more likely to delay bad news and accelerate good news related to litigation outcomes, compared to non-dependent suppliers. Such strategic disclosure patterns in our end-game setting are opposite to those documented in the existing supply chain literature for the repeated-game setting (for example, Hui, Klasa, and Yeung 2012).

Contrast analysis has become prevalent in experimental accounting research since Buckless and Ravenscroft (1990) introduced it to the accounting literature over 25 years ago. Since its initial introduction, the scope of contrast testing has expanded, yet guidance as to the most appropriate methods of specifying, conducting, interpreting, and exhibiting these tests has not. We survey the use of contrast analysis in the recent literature and propose a three-part testing approach that provides a more comprehensive picture of contrast results. Our approach considers three pieces of complementary evidence: the visual evaluation of fit, traditional significance testing, and quantitative evaluation of the contrast variance residual. Our measure of the contrast variance residual, q2, is proposed for the first time in this work. After proposing our approach, we walk through six common contrast testing scenarios where current practices may fall short and our approach may guide researchers. We extend Buckless and Ravenscroft (1990) and contribute to the accounting research methods literature by documenting current contrast analysis practices that result in elevated Type I error and by proposing a potential solution to mitigate these concerns.

We investigate whether PCAOB-identified audit deficiencies lead to higher audit fees or turnover likelihood for clients of Big 4 auditors. To examine this, we identify areas of GAAP related to PCAOB deficiencies for each auditor. We then use textual analysis to identify how important the deficiencies are to clients to measure each client's exposure to deficient auditing. We find that this measure positively relates to audit fees and that this association is moderated by client bargaining power. Auditor turnover is also higher when deficiency exposure is high relative to what it would be for peer auditors, but we only observe this relation for smaller clients and do not find it is affected by client bargaining power. Finally, we find that companies switching Big 4 auditors tend to select an auditor resulting in lower deficiency exposure. These results have implications for understanding how PCAOB inspection reports affect the market for audit services. JEL Classifications: M41; M42. Data Availability: We obtain all data from publicly available sources.

When using a tournament in multi-period settings, firms have discretion in selecting the tournament horizon. For example, firms can use a single tournament (a grand tournament) or a sequence of multiple tournaments, each with a shorter horizon than a grand tournament (a repeated tournament). Firms have also begun to use a combination of both in which a repeated tournament is embedded within a grand tournament (a hybrid tournament). Using an experiment, we investigate whether the effect of tournament horizon on performance depends on the dynamic complexity of the task, which reflects the potential for effort in one period to influence the link between effort and performance in future periods. When dynamic task complexity is low, we find that performance is greatest in the hybrid tournament, followed by the repeated and then the grand tournament. In contrast, when dynamic task complexity is high, we find that performance is greatest in the repeated tournament, followed by the grand and hybrid tournaments, with similar performance in the latter two tournaments. More generally, the results of our experiment suggest that the effect of tournament horizon on performance depends on dynamic task complexity. These results can help firms make better decisions when designing their tournaments by reinforcing the need to align the tournament horizon with the task.

When the fair value of an investment security falls below amortized cost and there is significant doubt that the firm can hold the security until the fair value recovers, an other-than-temporary impairment (OTTI) is recognized in net income. Thus, an OTTI is a disclosure about the prospect of recovering an unrealized loss. Our findings suggest that investors priced banks' OTTI recognition during and after the financial crisis. Investors were unable to fully anticipate reported OTTIs, and priced OTTIs incrementally to reported unrealized gains/losses. After banks were required to bifurcate OTTIs, investors priced only the portion of OTTI recognized in earnings. Our results suggest that reporting unrealized losses in earnings via an OTTI changes how investors price the losses. The results inform recent standard-setting initiatives to expand disclosure about changes in fair value. JEL Classifications: M41; M42; M44. Data Availability: Data are available from sources identified in the paper.

Some claim that rules-based accounting standards shield firms from litigation, while others argue that violations of detailed rules give plaintiffs a “roadmap” to successful litigation. We inform this debate by investigating whether rules-based standards are associated with the incidence and outcome of securities class action litigation. Overall, our results suggest that rules-based standards are associated with a lower incidence of litigation but are not associated with litigation outcomes. These results are of interest in the debate regarding the switch from a more rules-based U.S. GAAP to a more principles-based IFRS.