A Fast Literature Search Engine based on top-quality journals, by Dr. Mingze Gao.

  • Topic classification is ongoing.
  • Please kindly let me know [mingze.gao@mq.edu.au] in case of any errors.


  • ABSTRACT We show that institutions that promote financial development ease borrowing constraints by lowering the collateral spread and shifting the composition of acceptable collateral towards firm-specific assets. Collateral spread is defined as the difference in collateralization rates between high- and low-risk borrowers. The average collateral spread is large but declines rapidly with improvements in financial development driven by stronger institutions. We also show that the composition of collateralizable assets shifts towards non-specific assets (e.g., land) with borrower risk. However, the shift is considerably smaller in developed financial markets, enabling risky borrowers to use a larger variety of assets as collateral.

  • ABSTRACT How does competition in firms' product markets influence their behavior in equity markets? Do product market imperfections spread to equity markets? We examine these questions in a noisy rational expectations model in which firms operate under monopolistic competition while their shares trade in perfectly competitive markets. Firms use their monopoly power to pass on shocks to customers, thereby insulating their profits. This encourages stock trading, expedites the capitalization of private information into stock prices and improves the allocation of capital. Several implications are derived and tested.

  • ABSTRACT This paper presents a model that reproduces the uncovered interest rate parity puzzle. Investors have preferences with external habits. Countercyclical risk premia and procyclical real interest rates arise endogenously. During bad times at home, when domestic consumption is close to the habit level, the representative investor is very risk averse. When the domestic investor is more risk averse than her foreign counterpart, the exchange rate is closely tied to domestic consumption growth shocks. The domestic investor therefore expects a positive currency excess return. Because interest rates are low in bad times, expected currency excess returns increase with interest rate differentials.

  • Although the modern theory of financial intermediation portrays liquidity creation as an essential role of banks, comprehensive measures of bank liquidity creation do not exist. We construct four measures and apply them to data on virtually all U.S. banks from 1993 to 2003. We find that bank liquidity creation increased every year and exceeded $2.8 trillion in 2003. Large banks, multibank holding company members, retail banks, and recently merged banks created the most liquidity. Bank liquidity creation is positively correlated with bank value. Testing recent theories of the relationship between capital and liquidity creation, we find that the relationship is positive for large banks and negative for small banks.

  • Recent empirical work suggests that a proxy for the probability of informed trading (PIN) is an important determinant of the cross-section of average returns. This paper examines whether PIN is priced because of information asymmetry or because of other liquidity effects that are unrelated to information asymmetry. Our starting point is a model that decomposes PIN into two components, one related to asymmetric information and one related to illiquidity. In a two-pass Fama-MacBeth [1973. Risk, return, and equilibrium: empirical tests. Journal of Political Economy 81, 607–636] regression, we show that the PIN component related to asymmetric information is not priced, while the PIN component related to illiquidity is priced. We conclude, therefore, that liquidity effects unrelated to information asymmetry explain the relation between PIN and the cross-section of expected returns.

  • This article offers an explanation for the substantial variation of credit standards and price competition among banks over the business cycle. As the economic outlook improves, the average default probabilities of borrowers decline. This affects the profitability of screening and causes bank screening intensity to display an inverse U-shape as a function of economic prospects. Low screening activity in expansions creates intense price competition among lenders and loans are extended to lower-quality borrowers. As the economic outlook worsens, price competition diminishes, and credit standards tighten significantly. Deposit insurance may contribute to the countercyclical variation of credit standards.

Last update from database: 7/22/24, 11:00 PM (AEST)



Resource type

Publication year